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I.

INTRODUCTION

A recanting witness is a liar. Either he lied at trial or he is lying
now. When the recanting witness’s new story is joined by others, so
that his solo is now a chorus, the judicial system must find the
delicate balance between fairness to society and protection of the
individual defendant’s rights. When the case is old and the
recanting witnesses many, the difficulty of finding that balance is
even greater. Such were the circumstances facing the Minnesota
Supreme Court when, in 2004, it heard the case of Darby Opsahl, a
1
man convicted in 1992 of a murder that occurred in 1986.
† The author is a shareholder in the law firm Halleland, Lewis, Nilan &
Johnson, P.A. where he practices in the areas of internal investigation and fraud,
intellectual property and complex commercial litigation.
1. See generally State v. Opsahl, 677 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2004) [hereinafter
Opsahl II]. By the time he was convicted and sentenced, Opsahl was confined to a
wheelchair having been rendered quadriplegic in a car accident in 1990. See State

1489
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II. HISTORY OF THE OPSAHL CASE
A. The Murder and the Murder Investigation
On October 14, 1986, someone broke into a farmhouse in
2
Lester Prairie and shot Margaret Rehmann. The murder baffled
the authorities for years; weeks after the killing they had no clues as
to the motive for the shooting and no real evidence pointing
3
toward any suspect. Though the farmhouse door had been forced
open, there was no sign of a struggle inside, nothing was taken, and
4
the house had not even been searched. On the day of his wife’s
murder, Irvin Rehmann had lunch with her, then went back to
5
work on his son’s farm less than a mile away. When he returned
home at about 5:45 that afternoon, his wife of 43 years was dead on
6
the kitchen floor with a .44 caliber gunshot wound to her chest.
The investigation of the murder took a long and winding road
to the indictment of Darby Opsahl. A year after the murder, Jeffrey
Olson told the Carver County Sheriff’s Department that his friend
Darby Opsahl might know something about the murder, and that
7
he wanted to talk. Police met with Opsahl the next day, at which
time he told them that he and John Kanniainen had committed
burglaries in the Lester Prairie area about the time of the murder,
8
and that Kanniainen possessed a .44 caliber handgun. Opsahl told
investigators about the burglary of a farmhouse, which, “by his
9
description, matched the Rehmann residence fairly accurately.”
Opsahl said that while he stayed in the car and worked on the
10
radio, Kanniainen had gone to the front door. Opsahl recalled
11
seeing a woman with “brown hair, wearing red, at the door.” He
12
also noticed some chickens. While Kanniainen was in the house,

v. Opsahl, 513 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 1994) [hereinafter Opsahl I].
2. Opsahl I, 513 N.W.2d at 251.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 252.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The investigation of the crime scene revealed that Ms. Rehmann was
wearing a blue smock over a pink blouse. Id.
12. Id.
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13

Opsahl heard a shot. When he got back to the car, Kanniainen
told Opsahl he shot someone inside and displayed some half-dollar
14
coins he had taken from the house.
After this interview, police drove Opsahl and Olson to Lester
15
Prairie. According to the police, Opsahl visibly reacted when he
saw the Rehmann farmhouse and stated that it could have been the
16
place he and Kanniainen had burglarized.
Several months went by. In April, 1988, police confronted
Opsahl with the fact that Kanniainen could not have burglarized
the Rehmann residence because he had been in New Jersey the
17
Opsahl responded that “if
entire month of October, 1986.
18
Kanniainen had not done it, then he was not involved either.”
Some time during the same month Opsahl took and passed a
19
polygraph test.
The investigation went dormant again for another year until
June, 1989 when investigators took another statement from
20
Opsahl.
Opsahl “again stated that Kanniainen had . . . a .44
caliber handgun,” but made conflicting statements regarding
21
Kanniainen’s presence in Minnesota at the time of the murder.
Opsahl also “accompanied investigators to a store where he was
shown a lineup of handguns” from which he identified a .44 caliber
Magnum “as the kind of weapon Kanniainen had during the 1986
22
burglary.”
Another year went by until April, 1990, when Opsahl spoke
with police investigators for a third time, telling them that Olson,
who detested Kanniainen, had suggested to Opsahl that they blame
23
Kanniainen for the Rehmann murder. “Opsahl said that he and
Olson both knew that Kanniainen had been charged with a capital
murder in Florida and was in jail when Opsahl first met with police
24
in 1987.”

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Opsahl I, 513 N.W.2d at 252.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. The Trial and the Evidence
In April, 1992, a grand jury indicted Darby Opsahl and Jeffrey
25
26
Olson for the murder. The trial began in October of that year.
The evidence at trial linking Opsahl to the murder was thin. A
shoe print, fingerprints and a palm print were found at the crime
27
28
scene. None of this physical evidence matched Opsahl. The
29
murder weapon was never found. More importantly, the evidence
that did link Opsahl to the crime was circumstantial and far from
compelling. First, the prosecutors introduced evidence of Opsahl’s
statements in which he had described the farmhouse to police, had
“apparently” known that a .44 caliber weapon was used, that older
half-dollar coins had been taken, and that there were chickens at
30
the farm where the murder had occurred. In addition, a number
of Opsahl’s “friends” testified to conversations they had with
Opsahl, or in his presence, in which Opsahl implicated himself in
31
the murder.
Opsahl was convicted of first degree murder—
intentionally causing death during a burglary of a dwelling—and
32
was sentenced to life imprisonment.
C. Direct Appeal
On appeal, Opsahl challenged the grand jury indictment as
having been based in part upon the admission of statements
33
erroneously claiming that Opsahl had failed a lie detector test.
This mistake was compounded when the prosecutor refused to
allow one of the detectives to testify (in response to a question
posed by one of the grand jurors) that Opsahl had taken a lie
34
detector test but the results had been favorable. Opsahl argued
that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s actions confirmed the

25. See id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 251.
28. Id. The police were unable to identify whom the shoe print, fingerprints,
and palm print belonged to. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 252, 255.
31. Id. at 252–53; Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 418–19.
32. Opsahl I, 513 N.W.2d at 251 n.1.
33. Id. at 253. “Results of polygraph tests, as well as evidence that a defendant
took, or refused to take such a test, are not admissible in Minnesota in either
criminal or civil trials.” Id. (citations omitted).
34. Id.
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35

erroneous impression that Opsahl had failed the lie detector test.
The court rejected this argument, finding that the prosecutor’s
admonition to the jury to disregard all evidence regarding
36
polygraph examinations cured any defect.
Second, the court concluded that statements made by others
in the presence of Opsahl, but not testified to at trial, were
37
admissible.
Several witnesses were allowed to testify as to
38
statements that Olson and Tim Efteland had allegedly made.
39
Neither Olson nor Efteland were available to testify at trial. The
court found that these statements were admissible because the
information was elicited by Opsahl’s attorney and no objection to
40
the testimony was made at the time.
Third, and most importantly, the court addressed the
41
Opsahl argued that “the evidence
sufficiency of the evidence.
presented at trial was legally insufficient to convict him because it
was entirely circumstantial and based in large measure on
statements Opsahl [allegedly] made to investigators and to other
42
individuals.”
The statements made to police were somewhat
ambiguous; the statements made to others were less so. The court,
43
evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
stated:
Opsahl also made numerous admissions to the crime to
his friends, including Ross Reinitz, Laura Roberts, Robert
Beckman, Richard Rogowski and his former girlfriend,
Marina Allan. The jury had an opportunity to hear all the
testimony and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

35. Id.
36. See id. The prosecutor “properly cautioned the jurors on the use of
polygraph statements, both at the time the statements were made and at the end
of testimony.” Id. The court also stated that “[t]he prosecutor did not elicit the
testimony about the polygraph tests . . . .” Id.
37. Id. at 253–55.
38. Id. at 254.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 255.
42. Id.
43. On appeal, where the defendant raises the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the verdict, the question is subjected to this favorable review. Id. The
verdict is sustained if, giving the State all benefit of the doubt, there is sufficient
evidence that a reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty. Id.; see, e.g., State
v. Scruggs, 421 N.W.2d 707, 713 (Minn. 1988). As the court noted in Opsahl I,
when applying this standard, “[w]e will assume that the jury disbelieved any
testimony in conflict with [a guilty verdict].” 513 N.W.2d at 255.
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In our review, we must assume the jury believed the state’s
witnesses and rejected contrary evidence. Given that
assumption [that the jury credited the testimony of all these
witnesses], there was sufficient evidence to convict
44
Opsahl.
III. OPSAHL REDUX
A. In the Trial Court
In 2002, a decade after Opsahl’s conviction, The Innocence
45
Project of Minnesota began investigating Opsahl’s case. The
Project re-interviewed numerous witnesses, chased down
unfollowed leads regarding physical evidence, and in general
reinvestigated the investigation.
On October 29, 2002, Opsahl petitioned the trial court for
46
post-conviction relief, claiming that he was entitled to a new trial,
or at least to an evidentiary hearing, because the chorus of friends
47
had now recanted their trial testimony.
In addition, Opsahl raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct
48
The recanting
that were intertwined with the recantations.
witnesses allegedly provided misleading testimony under pressure
from the prosecutor to do so. Reinitz and Rogowski, who were on
probation at the time, claimed that the prosecutor threatened to
revoke their probation if they did not provide testimony favorable
49
to the State. Similarly, Roberts claimed that she informed the
prosecutor of the unreliability of her memory and was encouraged
50
to “testify without qualification.”
The trial court rejected Opsahl’s petition for a new trial as well

44. Id. at 255 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
45. The Innocence Project of Minnesota (IPMN) is dedicated to securing the
exoneration of persons convicted of crimes they did not in fact commit. It focuses
on claims of actual innocence as distinct from legal defenses such as self-defense.
Unlike some of its sister organizations in other states, however, the IPMN does not
limit its review to cases involving only DNA evidence. Though the Opsahl case
presented a claim of actual innocence, its procedural posture did not present an
opportunity for exoneration (though it could have resulted in a new trial and a
not-guilty verdict).
46. See MINN. STAT. § 590.04 (2004).
47. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 419.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 420.
50. Id.
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as the petition for an evidentiary hearing, finding that the
recantations were unreliable and, therefore, insufficient to make
the court “reasonably well satisfied that the trial testimony had in
51
fact been false.” As Judge Yost, the original trial judge in the case,
summed it up:
[At best, the court is] dealing with a chorus of liars, with
the only question being whether the concert was at trial,
or is it now, at the motion for a retrial. If it was at trial,
then they are perjurers all and if it is now, then they have
the unique ability to have their memory sharpen with the
52
passage of time.
B. In the Minnesota Supreme Court
1.

The State of the Evidence

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
53
This time the
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.
54
supreme court review was governed by a different standard. On
direct appeal the court had reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict; here they reviewed the
trial court’s findings regarding the recantations under an abuse of
55
discretion standard. In this opinion, unlike the 1994 opinion, the
court restated the testimony of the “friends” with greater detail and
precision. A review of that evidence, as described in the recent
decision, is thus worthwhile. As the court described it:
The State’s case relied on statements made by Opsahl to
several acquaintances that implicated him in the murder.
Ross Reinitz testified that he heard Olson tell Opsahl that
they “could always take care of [Opsahl’s neighbor like
they] took care of that old bitch by Lester Prairie.” Allen
Kroells provided similar testimony.
Laura Roberts
testified that Opsahl told her that he had hurt someone
during a robbery near Winsted, a small town near Lester
Prairie. Marina Allen, Opsahl’s former live-in girlfriend,
testified that during a fight, Opsahl told her to “shut up or
51. Id. at 420, 423. The “reasonably well satisfied” standard comes from
Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928).
52. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 427.
53. Id. at 425.
54. Id. at 421.
55. Id.
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I’m going to shoot you like I did that little old lady.”
Richard Rogowski testified that at a Fourth of July party in
1988, Opsahl admitted to him that he burglarized a house
where someone was shot. Dean Johnson testified that
Opsahl told him that he had shot and killed a woman
during a burglary. According to Robert Beckman, Opsahl
told him that Olson shot a woman in the head with a .44
caliber handgun. Cory Telthoester testified that Olson
told him that he and Opsahl burglarized the home and
that Opsahl shot an older woman in the house while
Olson was on his way out the window of the house. The
State presented no physical evidence linking Opsahl to
the murder . . . .
Opsahl testified in his own defense but called no other
witnesses. He denied that he was involved in the murder
. . . or that he ever told anyone that he had committed a
murder . . . . Opsahl denied making any admissions to
Rogowski at a Fourth of July party in 1988, claiming
instead that he attended a fireworks display in
56
Minneapolis.
In his petition for post-conviction relief, Opsahl submitted the
following recantation evidence. Rogowski, in an affidavit, claimed
that he made up the entire story and never even attended a Fourth
57
Reinitz swore that he had told
of July party with Opsahl.
prosecutors that he did not hear the exchange between Opsahl and
Olson clearly, “and that he was unsure of who made the original
58
comment about the murder.” He also swore in his affidavit that
“at the time of the conversation, he knew of the murder
59
investigation and assumed that the two were joking.” Similarly, in
her affidavit, Roberts stated that she used large amounts of drugs at
60
the time of the event and that her memory was suspect. William
O’Keefe, a private investigator, interviewed Dean Johnson, who,
though he did not recant his prior testimony, nonetheless implied
“that he had lied on the stand when he testified that he had just
opened his first beer of the night when Opsahl made his
61
incriminating statements.”
Similarly, Morrie Beaulier, the

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 418–19.
Id. at 419.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 419–20.
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attorney who represented Opsahl in 1998, swore that “Marina Allen
completely recanted her testimony to him, claiming that she
fabricated her testimony out of anger at Opsahl, who had been an
62
abusive boyfriend.”
2.

The Standard of Review

In reviewing the post-conviction proceedings, the Minnesota
Supreme Court will affirm that ruling absent an abuse of
63
discretion.
In determining whether to grant a new trial based
upon witness recantations, Minnesota follows the three-prong test
64
articulated in Larrison v. United States. To receive a new trial, the
petitioner must establish all three of the following prongs by a fair
preponderance of the evidence: (1) the court must be reasonably
well satisfied that the testimony in question was false; (2) that
without that testimony the jury might have reached a different verdict;
and (3) that the petitioner was surprised and/or did not know of
65
the falsity until after trial. In Minnesota, the third prong is not a
condition precedent for granting a new trial, but merely a factor to
66
be considered.
Though the standard for granting a new trial is governed by
Larrison, the showing required to receive an evidentiary hearing is
67
set by statute that imposes a much lower burden.
Minnesota
Statutes section 590.04, subdivision 1 requires the post-conviction
court to hold an evidentiary hearing “unless the petition and the
files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the
68
petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Thus, though the petitioner
69
must allege facts—not mere conclusions, that if proven, would
entitle him to a new trial, the post-conviction court is required to
70
resolve all doubts in favor of granting the evidentiary hearing and
71
must do so when material facts are in dispute. In circumstantial
evidence cases, such as Opsahl’s, evidentiary hearings are deemed

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 420.
Id. at 422.
24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928).
Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 423.
Id. (citing Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 442 (Minn. 2002)).
Id. (citing Ferguson, 645 N.W.2d at 446).
Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2004)).
Id. (citing Ferguson, 645 N.W.2d at 446).
Id. (citing King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn. 2002)).
Id. (citing Hodgson v. State, 540 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Minn. 1995)).
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72

particularly important.
3.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

As stated above, the trial court denied Opsahl’s petition
73
without holding an evidentiary hearing, thereby implicitly finding
the petitioner had presented no facts that could conceivably entitle
74
him to relief. Stated in another fashion, the trial court found that
the petition and the supporting affidavits conclusively showed that
Opsahl was not entitled to a new trial; therefore, no hearing was
necessary.
In arriving at its decision, the trial court found that the facts
presented could never meet the standard for a new trial—the court
was not now and would never be “well satisfied” that the testimony
75
of the recanting witnesses was false. “Based on [his own personal]
recollection of the trial, the [judge] concluded that Marina Allen’s
recantation was not reliable” and “that Reinitz and Roberts had a
better recollection of events at trial than [twelve years later] at the
76
post-conviction stage.” “With respect to Johnson, the court noted
77
that he did not change the substance of his testimony.” The trial
78
court simply ignored the affidavit of Rogowski.
Because the trial court had not been reasonably well satisfied
that the recanting testimony was false, it did not have to consider
79
the second prong of the Larrison test. Notwithstanding that fact,
however, the trial court had evaluated the second prong of the
Larrison test, concluding that the jury would not have reached a
different verdict even if the recanted testimony had never been
80
admitted.
On review, the Minnesota Supreme Court made a number of
important findings. First, the court found that the allegations in
Opsahl’s petition and the supporting affidavits easily met the
minimal standard for an evidentiary hearing under Minnesota
81
Statutes section 590.04, subdivision 1. The factual allegations in
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. (citing Ferguson, 645 N.W.2d at 446).
Id. at 417.
See id. at 423.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 420.
See id.
See id. at 423–24.
Id. at 423.
See id. at 424.
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the post-conviction pleadings were such that the trial court, as a
matter of law, could not have found that Opsahl was not even
entitled to a hearing. After all, the factual allegations raised the
possibility that the court, after a hearing, could be “reasonably well
satisfied” that the prior testimony had indeed been false. By
concluding that the recantations were unreliable without first
evaluating the credibility of the witnesses at an evidentiary hearing,
the post-conviction court misapplied Minnesota Statutes section
590.04 and abused its discretion.
The trial court had improperly leapfrogged over the
evidentiary hearing requirement to address the ultimate issue and,
in so doing, had glossed over the relevant evidentiary standard.
When addressing whether an evidentiary hearing should occur, the
trial court must give the benefit of the doubt to the new factual
allegations regarding the recanting witnesses. An evidentiary
hearing may only be avoided if the petition and the affidavits
“conclusively show” that the petitioner is entitled to no relief or, in
other words, that even assuming the accuracy of the petition and
the affidavits, there is conclusive proof that the court could never
be reasonably well satisfied that the original testimony of the
82
recanting witnesses had been false.
The district court had
impermissibly made a credibility determination based upon its
recollection of how those witnesses appeared at the trial ten years
earlier rather than evaluating the credibility of their new story at
the time of the hearing. The supreme court mandated the trial
83
court evaluate that credibility at a full-blown evidentiary hearing.
The supreme court got it right on this issue. When evaluating
a petition to determine whether an evidentiary hearing should
occur, the trial court is required to assume that the evidence could
84
be credible.
In this case, the trial court did not assume the
credibility of the evidence in deciding whether a hearing was
warranted; instead, it expressly made a credibility determination
85
and found a hearing unnecessary.
Turning to the second prong of the Larrison test, the supreme
court held “that the district court abused its discretion by
concluding that the jury would not have reached a different result

82.
83.
84.
85.

See id.
Id. at 425.
See id. at 423–24.
Id.
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86

without the recanted testimony.” The supreme court specifically
found that the second prong of the Larrison test was met without
87
the need for further proceedings. The court has held that if the
trial court is “reasonably well satisfied” that the recanted testimony
was false, then as a matter of law, it might have made a difference,
88
thereby warranting a new trial.
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the supreme
court had little difficulty finding an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion:
The petition and affidavits challenge the truth or
believability of five out of seven witnesses who testified
that they heard Opsahl make incriminating statements.
These recantations are particularly significant because
there was no physical evidence linking Opsahl to the
murder. Because Opsahl’s petition calls into question
such a significant part of the state’s circumstantial case, we
conclude that the postconviction court abused its
discretion by concluding that the jury would have reached
89
the same result without the recanted testimony.
In short, if the trial court were to find after an evidentiary hearing
that the recanting were witnesses credible, Opsahl would receive a
wholly new trial.
The supreme court also addressed the merits of Opsahl’s
claims of prosecutorial misconduct that were rejected by the trial
90
court. Threatening to revoke the probation of a witness in order
to secure favorable testimony clearly constitutes prosecutorial
91
misconduct. The remedy for that misconduct is a new trial unless
the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which is,
in turn, defined as only occurring “if the verdict rendered was
92
surely unattributable to the error.”
Here again, the supreme
court reversed the trial court’s decision as to its rejection of the
93
Since the post-conviction petition and
evidentiary hearing.
affidavits stated facts that, if proven, would constitute prosecutorial
misconduct, it was incumbent upon the trial court to at least hold

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 424.
See id.
Ferguson, 645 N.W.2d at 444–45.
Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 424.
Id.
See MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 8.4(c), (d) (2002).
State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294, 301–02 (Minn. 2000).
Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 424–25.
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the evidentiary hearing to make factual findings as to the witness’
94
credibility. As the court stated, “when a petitioner presents sworn
statements that some of the testimony used to convict him was
falsified and the product of improper coercion by the prosecution,
95
such allegations [require]...a postconviction evidentiary hearing.”
Given the standard on this issue, if the trial court determined that
the witnesses were credible, then Opsahl would be entitled to a new
trial.
Finally, the majority opinion addressed the State’s alternative
argument, that the lapse of time between Opsahl’s conviction and
the filing of his post-conviction petition was so great as to preclude
96
him from receiving relief.
The trial court did not reach this
97
argument. Accordingly, the supreme court remanded the case for
the evidentiary hearing and directed the trial court that if it
determined that Opsahl was otherwise entitled to a new trial, it
“shall address the state’s alternative argument that the ten year
98
lapse in time... should preclude him from receiving relief.”
99
Justice Gilbert dissented. He took issue with that part of the
opinion remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing based on
100
Justice
the alleged recanted testimony of five trial witnesses.
Gilbert offered three reasons for his dissent. First, because the
recanted testimony was presented by affidavit, a form of evidence
provided for in Minn. Stat. section 590.04, subdivision 3, he argued
101
that Opsahl had in effect already received an evidentiary hearing.
Opsahl’s election to provide evidence in the form of affidavits
meant that he had enjoyed his one bite at the apple. Justice
Gilbert’s dissent on this point is not without some support in the
record. The trial court, in its order, made detailed findings of fact
102
and conclusions of law–thirty-nine pages in all. As Justice Gilbert
noted, Judge Yost, the judge who presided over the original trial in
1992, was uniquely well-situated to assess witness credibility—with
103
or without personal appearances by those witnesses.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 424.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 426.
Id.
Id.
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But is this the correct view of the statutory provision of an
evidentiary hearing? According to Minnesota Statutes section
590.04, a hearing on the petition “shall be in open court,” the court
may order the petitioner to be present at the hearing, and in the
discretion of the court “it may receive evidence in the form of
104
affidavit, deposition, or oral testimony.” In this case, Opsahl was
105
The affidavits filed in
not afforded an evidentiary hearing.
support of the petition were not intended to be in lieu of evidence
that Opsahl’s attorneys would have presented had an evidentiary
hearing been granted. The court did not agree to an evidentiary
hearing with some evidence to be submitted in the form of
affidavits; rather, it read the affidavits and based on its own
recollection determined that no further evidentiary hearing was
106
necessary.
Second, Justice Gilbert opined that the majority erred because
the allegations, even if true, did not attack the “overwhelming
amount of inculpatory (nonrecanted) evidence supporting the
107
guilty verdict.” In this regard, Justice Gilbert’s dissent misses the
mark. The standard is not whether the recantations attack all of
the inculpatory evidence, but whether the recanted testimony was
significant enough that, without it, a jury might not have reached
108
the same result.
Nor can one agree with Justice Gilbert’s
weighing of the evidence. In this case, there was no physical
109
evidence linking Opsahl to the crime or the crime scene.
The
unrecanted evidence, like the recanted evidence, was not only
entirely circumstantial, it was virtually all based on statements
110
attributed to Opsahl himself.
Five of the seven witnesses who
111
provided that evidence later recanted. In that circumstance, it is
hard to see how the recantation, if believable, might not have led
the jury to reach a different result.
Justice Gilbert’s opinion also points out that on direct appeal
in 1994, the supreme court had already found that the evidence

104. MINN. STAT. § 590.04, subds. 2, 3 (2002).
105. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 425.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 426 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
108. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 423 (relying on the three-prong test established
in Larrison v. U.S., 24 F.2d 82, 87–88).
109. Id. at 419.
110. See id. at 424.
111. Id.
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was more than sufficient to sustain the conviction.
But this
observation offers little justification given the procedural posture of
the case. On direct appeal, the standard of review considers the
113
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Viewed from
that perspective in 1994, the evidence was sufficient, the court itself
placing great weight on the witness statements that were later
114
recanted.
In 2004, Justice Gilbert wrote “[t]he alleged recanted
115
testimony in this case was not pivotal to appellant’s conviction.”
The mere fact that on direct review the whole of the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the verdict provides little insight into the
question whether, without much of that evidence, the jury might
have reached a different result.
Finally, Justice Gilbert found the trial court’s thirty-nine pages
of findings of fact and its assessment of credibility to be
116
persuasive.
The trial court, in his view, clearly assessed the
credibility of the witnesses by comparing the inherent credibility of
the affidavit testimony against his own memory of the credibility of
117
the witnesses as they appeared at trial. In the end, Justice Gilbert
also pointed out the inherent unfairness to the State if this case
118
In such a situation, the Court
were to be ordered for retrial.
noted, that “[t]he murder took place 17 years ago and the trial
took place 11 years ago. Two material witnesses who testified at
trial have since died and two others apparently cannot be located.
Prejudice to the state may be a legitimate problem in this case
should the postconviction court determine on remand that a new
119
trial would otherwise be warranted.”
IV. CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF OPSAHL
When considering the long-term meaning of Opsahl, two lines
of inquiry are pertinent. First, is Opsahl precedential? Second, if a
new trial is warranted, what can, will, or should the result be?

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 426 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
Id.
See Opsahl I, 513 N.W.2d at 255.
Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 426 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 427.
Id.
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A. Is Opsahl Precedential?
Has the Opsahl decision changed or clarified the law in any
significant respect, or is it merely a decision that applies well-settled
law to a unique factual setting? On the one hand, Opsahl has not
changed the standards for receiving a new trial. The supreme
120
This, in itself, is no
court reaffirmed its adherence to Larrison.
small matter. The majority of federal circuits (including the 8th
Circuit) do not adhere to Larrison, but require a higher level of
121
proof in order to obtain a new trial.
In those jurisdictions it is
not enough to show that the jury might have reached a different
result; instead, one must show that the absence of the testimony
122
would probably have led to an acquittal. The court’s reaffirmation
of Larrison maintains the more lenient standard.
Secondly, Opsahl makes it clear that in applying that standard
to a circumstantial evidence case, the recantation of any significant
testimony will almost surely meet the “might-have-made-adifference” standard.
Finally, the majority opinion seems to have adopted a brightline test for obtaining an evidentiary hearing under Minnesota
Statutes section 590.04, subdivision 3. It seems clear now that the
evidentiary hearing required by this statute means the taking of live
testimony. While the trial court may have felt that it had held an
evidentiary hearing by considering the affidavits and assessing its
own recollection, the supreme court disagreed. When witness
credibility is at stake, the court must observe the witnesses live, if
possible.
In a circumstantial evidence case involving the
recantation of testimony, such a hearing is hardly controversial.
B. What Happens Next?
If the trial court had found that a new trial was warranted (it
did not) because it was reasonably well-satisfied that the testimony
120. Id. at 422.
121. U.S. v. Williams, 233 F.3d 592, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Today we join
several other circuits in rejecting Larrison.”) (citing U.S. v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527,
1532 (10th Cir.1997); U.S. v. Provost, 969 F.2d 617, 622 (8th Cir.1992); U.S. v.
Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844–45 (9th Cir.1979); U.S. v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 246 (2d
Cir.1975)).
122. Id. at 593 (“[A] defendant is not entitled to a retrial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence unless he can show that ‘a new trial would probably produce an
acquittal.’” (citing and adopting Thompson v. U.S., 188 F.2d 652, 653 (D.C.Cir.
1951))).
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was false, the question is, what would have become of Darby
Opsahl? Setting aside the legal niceties of this issue, it appears that
a few policy observations are possible.
First, despite the involvement of The Innocence Project,
Opsahl’s case is not an exoneration case. Absent clear scientific or
objectively verifiable evidence, Darby Opsahl could not have been
exonerated in the sense of being declared innocent and freed from
prison. He might have received a new trial and prevailed, or the
prosecution decided that it could not have re-tried the case for lack
of evidence given the passage of time; but it seems unlikely that
either the court or the prosecution would have declared Opsahl an
innocent man.
This observation leads to a discussion of the least satisfying
aspect of Opsahl. The supreme court directed the trial court to
weigh the prejudice to the State occasioned by the passage of time
against Opsahl’s entitlement to an “otherwise . . . warranted” new
123
trial.
If Opsahl was otherwise entitled to a new trial it is because
the trial court was reasonably well satisfied that the recanted
testimony was false and that, if it had not been admitted the first
time, a jury might have found Opsahl not guilty.
This is the delicate balance described above. The individual
124
defendant has a right to a true presumption of innocence.
If a
jury “might have” acquitted him but for tainted evidence, the
presumption leans toward a new trial. Yet, in this case the
recanting witnesses are friends of the defendant, many with their
own axes to grind against the prosecution. This is why the
credibility determination is critical. The State will truly be
prejudiced by having to prosecute a crime that is eighteen years
old. The State and the victims have interests at stake as well. These
interests and prejudices are significant in striking the delicate
balance.
In the final analysis, the supreme court left this decision to the
trial court because the case presented by the chorus of liars is so
intractable, particularly in an appellate review. One pictures the
justices holding their noses as they review the recantation evidence
and holding their breath as they awaited the decision below.

123. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 427.
124. State v. Wagner, 637 N.W.2d 330, 338 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (“It is
elementary fundamental justice that the only presumption in criminal law is the
presumption of innocence.”).
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